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MUTUAL ASSENT IN SIMPLE CONTRACTS
NOTES
MUTUAL ASSENT IN SIMPLE CONTRACTS.
That mutual assent is necessary for the formation of
simple contracts all agree, but whether this assent is the
actual mental assent of the parties or their assent as ex-
pressed either by their words or acts is a question on which
there seems to be considerable dispute. In a learned and
helpful article by Mr. Samuel Williston, the author takes
great pains to demonstrate that the test is objective rather
than subjective, and that the phrase so commonly used dur-
ing the early part of the nineteenth century, namely, the
"meeting-of-minds," is a misleading and an inaccurate de-
scription of the necessary element of mutual assent.'
It will be attempted in this note to set forth Mr. Willis-
ton's ideas and arguments on this subject as simply and as
clearly as possible.
During the latter part of the eighteenth century and the
early part of the nineteenth century the authorities were of
opinion that the intent of the parties, rather than their ex-
pressed intent, was material, and that the words or acts, by
means of which the state of their minds was shown, were
the necessary evidence to prove the intent. But, at the pres-
ent time, the courts of law, in this country especially, have
abandoned this theory and hold that the contractual liability
is determined by the overt acts of the parties. This modern
view is very clearly set forth in the case of Hotchkiss v. Na-
tional City Bank, 200 Fed. 287, 293. In the opinion Justice
Hand says:
"A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the
personal or individual intent of the parties. A contract is
an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accom-
pany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were
1. "Wlgmore Celebration Legal Essays," p. 525.
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proved by twenty bishops that either party when he used the
words intended something else than the usual meaning which
the law imposes .upon them, he would still be held, unless
there were some mutual mistake or something else of the
sort."
It may be contended that the results reached in the mod-
ern cases can be attained as well under the old theory of the
"meeting-of-minds" as under the modern theory. This, how-
ever, would only be possible if we held the acts of the parties
to be not merely presumptions of the intent, but conclusive
presumptions. And, as Mr. Williston points out, it would be
highly "undesirable to state the law in terms of conclusive
presumptions. " I
Others might contend that this result could be reached
by employing the doctrine of estoppel. They would hold that
a person who had, by his acts or words, deceived the other
party in respect to his actual intent would be estopped from
showing that actual intent. The trouble with this theory is
that the doctrine of estoppel applies only where the party to
whom the representation has been made has acted upon it to
his detriment. The fact that in many cases this element is
wanting conclusively demonstrates that the subjective test
cannot be upheld on this theory.
The soundness of the objective theory and the falsity of
the subjective theory is further brought out by the parol-
evidence rule. Generally speaking, this rule excludes oral
testimony to vary the terms of a writing. As Mr. Wigmore
points out, this kind of evidence is not excluded because of
the character of the proof, but because the facts to be proved
by it are held to be immaterial. "The parol-evidence rule is
in truth no rule of evidence, but of substantive law." 2
Mr. Williston enumerates numerous modern cases in which
it would be impossible to attain the results reached other
than employing the objective test. He mentions contracts
2. "Greenleaf on Evidence" (Wigmore's), 16th Ed., Vol. 1, see note,
p. 404.
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made through interpreters who misinterpret, through tele-
phone operators who fail to repeat messages accurately, those
in which a message is inaccurately transmitted by the tele-
graph company, and those where a person, after learning
the price of an article in a store, takes the article, but de-
clines to pay the price demanded. It can be seen at a glance
that the contracts in these cases can be established only by
means of the objective test.
It is admitted that there are some courts that would deny
that some or perhaps all of the instances cited above are
cases of contracts, but there is one instance universally ac-
cepted by all courts, and which can be explained by the ob-
jective test alone. This is where an offer is to be accepted
by mail; after mailing the offer, the offerer, changing his
mind, sends a revocation, but the offeree mails his acceptance
before the notice of revocation reaches him. All courts will
agree that this is the case of a valid and binding contract,
and their conclusion can be reached only by the objective test.
It is true that in some cases, such as the famous "Peerless
case,"3 we find the court seeking the intent of the parties.
But here the expressed intent is ambiguous and, as Mr.
Holmes points out, the actual intent of the parties is sought
for no other reason than to explain the true meaning of the
external acts. He says:
"The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the
parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by ex-
ternals and judge the parties by their conduct. . . . The
true ground of the decision was not that each party meant a
different thing from the other, as is implied by the explana-
tion which has been mentioned, but that each said a different
thing. The plaintiff offered one thing; the defendant ex-
pressed his assent to another." 4
The cases where a reward is offered for the doing of an
act, such as the return of a lost article, the arrest and con-
viction of a criminal, etc., would seem at first sight to deny
the validity of the objective test. For, by the weight of au-
3. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906.
4. Holmes, "The Common Law," p. 309.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
thority, it is held in such cases that there is no contract unless
the party doing the act does it with the intention of earning
the reward. It would therefore seem that the intent of the
parties is the controlling factor. But, upon a closer examina-
tion of these cases and the facts involved, it will be seen that
they are not in conflict with the objective theory. The act
itself in all these cases implies neither acceptance nor refusal
of the offer. For example: A, having lost his watch, offers
a reward to the person who shall find and return it. B finds
the watch and returns it to A. Like all other individuals,
B is presumed to be honest until proven otherwise and, there-
fore, we have no more right to presume that he returned the
watch in order to get the reward than that, in ignorance of
the reward, having found A's watch, he returned it to him
just as any honest person would do. Wherefore we see that
the act itself does not carry with it the presumption of assent
on the part of B. The act is ambiguous, and in all such cases
it becomes necessary for the court to examine the intent of
the parties in order to determine the true nature of the act.
In spite of the fact that the great majority of courts of
law at the present time recognize and apply the objective
test and have long since discarded the theory of the "meeting-
of-minds," courts of equity, to some extent at least, and
especially in England, persist in resting their decrees for
rescission and reformation of contra6ts on account of mis-
take on the ground that the minds of the parties never met.
In so doing, they necessarily assume that the mental assent
is the controlling factor. In this connection Mr. Williston
says:
"Such a theory, however, is unnecessary to support the
jurisdiction of the court, and indeed cannot be consistently
carried out without violating actual law and good sense.
There is no reason why a court of equity should not set aside
a contract which the parties have made whenever it is just
to do so. Equity unquestionably exercises this jurisdiction
when a contract is procured by fraud, and its jurisdiction to
rescind a contract for mistake is entirely analogous. And
when parties have intended to make a certain contract or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol6/iss1/5
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conveyance and have failed to do so, it is not necessary to
assert that their intention of itself created a contract or
conveyance in order to justify a court in imposing on the
parties the consequences of an act which they intended, but
did not do. . . . If attention is fixed not so much on what
courts of equity have said as on what they have done, it is
clear that they, like courts of law, have adopted an objective
standpoint." 5
It may be contended by some that this discussion is but
a quibble over the minutiae of form, and that as long as all
courts today reach the same conclusions in cases of simple
contracts, it really matters not what words or expressions
they use in so doing. But is this a sound contention? We
think not. In the law, more so than in any other subject, is
it of vital importance to avoid the careless and "slip-shod"
use of language. Uncertainty and ambiguity of expression
should not be countenanced. If we mean black, let us say
black, and not White, pink, green, or even dark brown. If
the expressed intent of the parties to a contract is the deter-
mining factor, let us say so in as many words, and not be
satisfied with an expression such as the "meeting-of-minds,"
which means an entirely different thing.
But it is not only a question of expression. Some courts
and writers still insist that mental assent is the necessary
element. Yet in these very courts we find that the parties
are held to the necessary implications of what they said or
did, irrespective of what they thought. And if the words
or acts of the parties are in all courts the basis for determin-
ing their contractual liability, then it follows that the ex-
pression of intent, and not the intent, is the controlling factor.
This being the case, does it not necessarily follow that the
expression of assent, and not the mental assent, is the neces-
sary element? It is difficult to see how this can be denied.
E. A. SHEPLEY.
5. "Wigmore Celebration Legal Essays," p. 532, 533.
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